Source: Xiaoying Qi (2011), "Face: A Chinese Concept in a Global Sociology," Journal of Sociology
- Title: Face: A Chinese concept in a global sociology
- Author: Xiaoying Qi
- Publication: Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47(3): 279–295 (The Australian Sociological Association), 2011. DOI 10.1177/1440783311407692.
- URL: https://assets.super.so/8b7a9231-848a-4433-b067-ec003ee81dbc/files/f8201111-9c0b-40fc-a096-ed76273be529/Qi_2011_-_Face_-_A_Chinese_concept_in_a_global_sociology.pdf (open PDF; the SAGE journal page itself, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1440783311407692, returned HTTP 403 to WebFetch)
- Type: primary/secondary hybrid — a peer-reviewed academic article, read directly in full (converted to text with
pdftotext -layoutafterpoppler-utilswas installed this session), that itself quotes and analyzes several earlier primary sources (Hu 1944, Goffman 1955/1972, Ho 1976, Hsu 1996, Earley 1997, Cheng 1986). Stance: analytical/synthetic, arguing for face as a genuine contribution of Chinese social thought to "global" sociology, not skeptical of the concept's validity. - Accessed: 2026-09-03 (direct full-text read)
Extract
- Goffman's essay directly acknowledges a Chinese source. Qi states: "An early and unrecognized instance of such a development is Goffman's now classic elaboration of the concept of face. While not highlighting his reliance on the Chinese conception of face, which he nevertheless acknowledges in a footnote at the beginning of his discussion (Goffman, 1972: 5–6 footnote 1)..." — i.e., in the opening footnote of "On Face-Work" (1955; reprinted 1972 in Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior), Goffman cites earlier accounts of the Chinese concept of face, including Hu (1944). This directly confirms — via primary reading of Qi's own text, not a WebSearch synthesis — an earlier, less certain WebSearch-sourced claim this project deliberately did not file without verification (see the word page's method note): a major 20th-century Western sociological framework (the ancestor of Brown & Levinson's politeness theory) is documented as directly derived from and citing Chinese-language ethnographic material on face, not merely analogous to it independently.
- Hu Hsien-Chin (1944)'s classic mianzi/lian distinction, quoted exactly with page numbers. Qi quotes Hu (1944: 45) defining lian as "respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation… it represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral character, the loss of which make it impossible for him to function properly within the community." Qi quotes Hu (1944: 45) defining mianzi, by contrast, as standing "for the kind of prestige… [of] a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation… For this kind of recognition ego is dependent at all times on his external environment." The short-hand version: lian = moral standing conferred by the community; mianzi = social prestige/status achieved through visible success.
- The clean moral/social dichotomy does not hold up, per Qi's own synthesis of the later literature: Ho (1976: 868) notes mianzi is "not altogether devoid of moral content" and that the two terms "are not completely differentiated from each other in that the terms are interchangeable in some contexts." Qi shows, from Hu's own examples, cases running against the clean split: a lecturer unable to answer students' questions "loses lian" (Hu 1944: 48) with no clear moral failing involved, while a case of nepotism ("so-and-so wanted to give him some mien-tzu [mianzi]," Hu 1944: 57) does carry moral weight. Many everyday Chinese face-expressions built on lian (zhanglian, shanglian, sipo lian, heilian, honglian, etc.) likewise carry no clean moral sense. Hu (1944: 62) herself states the two "are not two entirely independent concepts," and several near-synonymous phrase pairs (zhanglian/zengjia mianzi both "to increase face"; shiqu lianmian/shiqu mianzi both "to lose face") are used near-interchangeably in ordinary Chinese.
- Competing later academic proposals for distinguishing lian and mianzi, all reported by Qi: Earley (1997: 56) — lian as rules for moral conduct vs. mianzi as social-structural position (enactment of correct behavior vs. an outcome state). Hsu (1996) — lian for face-relevant situations of great gravity vs. mianzi for more mundane incidents (a severity-based rather than moral/social split). A further account (Cheng 1986, reported by Qi as not necessarily opposed to Hsu's) frames "the mien-tzu of a person" as "the uppermost limit of his dignity and social respectability" that others cannot force him beyond, while lian sets a lower, more easily damaged floor.
- Qi's own methodological framing: this is explicitly presented as a case study in "the mobility of social science concepts from one cultural setting to another" — an argument that a non-Western (Chinese) folk/analytic concept has already substantially shaped mainstream Western sociological theory (via Goffman, and via Goffman's own influence on Brown & Levinson's politeness theory in linguistics), inverting the usual direction this project's other cultural-politics material documents (Western marketing/exoticization of a non-Western word) — see the word page's Cultural-politics/reception section.
Gaps
- Qi's own preference, stated late in the article, is to use the single term "mianzi" as a catch-all rather than sustain a rigorous lian/mianzi distinction throughout her own analysis — meaning even this article's own use of the two terms is not perfectly disciplined by the distinction it reports from Hu, Ho, Hsu, and Earley.
- Hu's original 1944 American Anthropologist article itself was not directly read by this project — all Hu quotations here are Qi's own quotations of Hu, with page numbers, not independently checked against Hu's original text (the AnthroSource page returned HTTP 403 to WebFetch this session).
- Whether Goffman's footnote names Hu specifically (as opposed to only Smith 1894 and/or Yang 1945, per other sources found this session — see wikipedia-face-sociological-concept.md) is not fully disambiguated in the passage read; Qi's own bibliography lists Hu (1944) among works she says inform "the discussion of face by Chinese sociologists," used elsewhere in her own argument, not stated verbatim as the content of Goffman's specific footnote citation list.